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FORMAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:
STATEMENT AND SET-THEORETIC APPROACHES
Abstract. The so-called received view of scientific theory, initially proposed by logical positivists,
represented scientific theory as a set of statements of some formal language, ordered by syntactic
relation of deductive derivability. By late 1960s this strategy had met with severe criticism
which called into question the effectiveness of formal methods in philosophy of science. The
set-theoretic (semantic) approach in formal philosophy of science, which can be treated as
natural development of received view, is based on the concept of model in Tarski’s sense and is
capable of neutralizing the most part of these objections.
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The standard (statement or syntactic) approach to the formalization and analysis of
scientific theories, initially put forward by logical positivists, linked the possibility of
successful resolution of certain epistemic problems (such as differentiation of analytic
and synthetic statements of scientific theories, search of elementary and doubtless foun-
dations of scientific knowledge etc.) with the idea of strict explication of these problems
in some artificial language. The scientific theory which might be subject to philosoph-
ical analysis should be construed as a partially interpreted axiomatic system with its
fundamental laws taken as axioms and formulated in some theoretical language 𝐿𝑇 .
Observable conclusions that could be drawn from statements of theoretical languages
should be expressed in a separate observation language (language of the observables)
𝐿𝑂. Сonnection between the concepts, belonging to 𝐿𝑇 , 𝐿𝑂 ought to be implemented
by means of so-called coordinate rules (reduction statements). Only concepts from 𝐿𝑂
could be treated as directly meaningful.
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In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics of this approach to the analysis of
scientific knowledge as statement/syntactic, H. Putnam dubbed it “the received view”.
Thus, for the purpose of successful methodological analysis a certain scientific theory
should be exposed as (partially) interpreted set of statements of some formal language,
which is (partially) ordered by the (syntactic) relation of deductive derivability. The
common definition of scientific theory “in general terms” as a set of statements, closed
under relation of deductive derivability / ordered by this relation, harks back to the
standard/received view of scientific theories.
It should be noted, that as usual the concept of standard treatment of scientific
theories is identified with the concept of standard formalization (standard formalization
of a theory is its complete formalization/axiomatization in the first order predicate logic
with equality). Such identification proves to be utterly incorrect, although almost all
critics of standard approach do not tell these notions apart. This fact led to serious
misinterpretation of the whole program of logical positivism.
Among the objections which had been raised against received view by late 1960s,
were the following ones:
Theories of empirical sciences cannot be effectively and naturally formalized in the
language of first order predicate logic; but even if such formalization had been fulfilled,
it would have fallen short of its main aim—precise identification/ characterization of
the theory. According to the theorem of the existence of a non-standard model, if a
theory has at least one infinite model, it also has an infinite model of any cardinality, i.e.
via such type of formalization intended models of the theory cannot be discriminated
from unintended ones and axioms of the theory will be realizable on some “paradoxical”
domains.
Theories are not purely linguistic objects—sets of statements / well-formed formulas
of some artificial language, linked by the syntactic relation of deductive derivability.
According to the core principles of logical semantics, only statements (propositions)
can be evaluated as true or false; hence, the category of truth as well as the traditional
(correspondent) theory of truth prove completely inapplicable to the analysis of real
structure of scientific knowledge.
As a result, formal methods of the analysis of scientific knowledge are deemed
“inappropriately rigid” for the purposes of philosophy and methodology of science.
However, certain drawbacks of the statement view (being also seriously exaggerated)
do not inevitably lead to the total rejection of formal methods in the philosophy of
science.
One of the most natural alternatives to the statement representation of scientific
theories is the set-theoretic (model-theoretic, structuralist, semantic) approach to the
formalization of scientific theories, aiming at direct characterization of all intended
models of the theory.
This strategy in the formal philosophy of science is based on the concept of (formal)
model of a theory (in Tarski’s sense), admits of evaluation of the theory as true or false
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in a “correspondent” sense (with certain reservations though) and is free from the most
part of the drawbacks of the received view (Suppes 1961).
Scientific theories can be treated as hierarchies of models of various type-theoretic
levels. A model is understood as a possible realization of a theory satisfying its axioms.
Possible realization is an ordered triple of elements ⟨𝐷, 𝑅, 𝐹⟩, where 𝐷 is a non-empty
domain, 𝑅 is a non-empty set of relations (predicate symbols) defined on 𝐷, and 𝐹 is
a (possibly empty) set of functions defined on 𝐷.
A certain possible realization is a model of some theory iff all fundamental laws (ax-
ioms) of the theory are true under interpretation in terms of ⟨𝐷, 𝑅, 𝐹⟩. The structure
of a theory is the ordered set of the models of different types.
Since the structure of the theory is a set-theoretic, i.e. non-linguistic object, the
concepts of truth and falsity cannot be applied to it directly. Instead the following
fundamental empirical hypothesis of the theory should be formulated and estimated:
There is a certain (structural) correspondence between the elements of the domain
of empirical theory (models of data) and highly idealized models of the fundamen-
tal laws (axioms) of the theory, which provides adequate representation of observable
phenomena in abstract models of the theory. The rigour of such correspondence (iso-
morphism, partial isomorphism, embeddability of the models of the theory into each
other) may vary in different versions of the set-theoretic approach.
Provided such correspondence is verified (for empirical sciences this procedure can-
not be purely formal), the theory proves (approximately) true in correspondent sense.
According to Frederick Suppe, one of the adherents of semantic approach, there
are at least two different stages in the process of “methodological ascent” from the
observables to fundamental axioms of the theory:
1) transition from observable phenomena to the so-called data models (hard data),
which can be also called scientific facts in a proper sense;
2) transition from data models to fundamental postulates of the theory.
Coordinate rules in their traditional interpretation used to mix up these two stages
that resulted in elimination of models from theory analysis.
The first stage presupposes statistical processing of empirical data and their inter-
pretation in terms of (at least tentatively) accepted theories—conceptualizing of the
theory domain in some theoretical vocabulary and the construction of its initial model
(physical system). This stage is inherently counterfactual: e.g. in classical mechanics
we do not deal with “tangible” velocities, accelerations and masses, but rather with log-
ically possible values of such parameters under some idealized conditions (frictionless
movement of non-dimensional mass-points). By means of a special empirical method-
ology this strategy enables us to predict and explain the dynamics of some observable
phenomena which do not satisfy certain idealized conditions: how the actual observ-
able phenomena would behave were the idealized conditions met. (In this way from
physical models we get causally possible ones; Suppe 1989.) As this idea was stated by
Логико-философские штудии. ISSN 2223-3954 93
Nikolay Arkhiereev. Formal Philosophy of Science: Statement and Set-Theoretic Approaches
Stathis Psillos,
A description 𝐷 approximately fits a state 𝑆 (i.e. 𝐷 is approximately true of 𝑆)
if there is another state 𝑆′ such that 𝑆 and 𝑆′ are linked by specific conditions of
approximation, and 𝐷 fits 𝑆′ (𝐷 is true of 𝑆′).
So, for instance, a theoretical law is approximately true of the world, if it is strictly
true in a world which approximates ours under certain conditions... (Psillos 1999:
268)
The main function of a scientific theory is to pick out from the class of logically
possible theory models the causally possible ones. A theory can be regarded as em-
pirically true iff the class of its logically possible models coincides with the class of
its causally possible models (or—not so rigorously—the class of its logically possible
models “covers completely” the whole class of its causally possible models).
Empirical evaluation of the fundamental hypothesis of the theory requires a for-
mulation and a proof of the so-called representation theorem, which underlies a theory
of measurement (correlates quantitative numerical models of observable phenomena
with its qualitative empirical “prototypes”) and demonstrates the presence of common
invariant characteristics, intrinsic to the models of the different types. These invariant
characteristics allow for a description of a class of possible models of the theory in
terms of a single set-theoretic structure.
Apart from the language of a set theory (informal or axiomatized), higher-order
languages of predicate logic or language of category theory might be successfully used
for the description of the theories of empirical sciences.
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